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DETERMINATION OF SUPERIOR EQUITIES IN
CASES OF MARSHALING AND SUBROGATION
C. SEVERIN BUSCHMANN
The principles of marshaling of securities and of subrogation
are useful in placing losses, as far as possible, upon the parties
ultimately liable. Developed at an early stage of the law, the
rules have been extended to new situations and are of increasing
importance in our decisions.
The equitable remedy of subrogation has long been established
in our law and has gradually become more extended in its scope.
Originally it had a narrow application,-being considered usu-
ally in cases where sureties had discharged duties of their prin-
cipals and were seeking to be subrogated or substituted to rights
of the creditors.' The doctrine was applied more liberally by
later courts and has been expanded until now it applies gener-
ally to all those obligations discharged by a person not pri-
marily liable, but who is acting either in performance of a legal
duty, to protect a legal right, at the request of the party ultim-
ately liable for the debt, and possibly in other cases where fa-
vored by public policy.2 In such cases the subrogee can work
out his right only through the creditor, and consequently his
rights are limited to those of the creditor.3 The usual situation
is where he is simply substituted to a single right of the creditor
who has been paid off by him. It frequently happens, however,
that the subrogee, instead of actually paying out his money to
a creditor, has a fund belonging to such subrogee taken by a
creditor who had superior rights in the fund. In such a situa-
tion, if the paramount creditor has available any other rights
by which he might have realized his claim, the possibility arises
14 Pomeroy Eq. Juris. (4th ed.) 1419.
2 5, Pomeroy Eq. Juris. (2d ed.) 2343.
3 5 Pomeroy Eq. Juris (2d ed.) 2349.
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of the subrogee ultimately avoiding the loss, by marshaling or
subrogation.
The principle underlying the equitable remedy of marshal-
ing of securities is that a person having two funds, from either
of which he can satisfy his claim, should not be allowed by his
election to take the one from which alone another party can
satisfy his claim.4 In order to obtain this relief, however, the
holder of the two funds must not be inconvenienced in the col-
lection of his debt, or prejudiced,5 nor will it be granted where
it will prejudice the rights of third persons.6
The principle of subrogation as a corollary to the principle
of marshaling assets frequently arises where the doctrine of
marshaling cannot be carried out. The rule may be stated as
follows: Where one party has a right to resort to two funds
for the satisfaction of his debt and another has a junior right
against only one of them, if the former exercise his superior
right to satisfy his claim out of the only one to which the
junior claimant can resort, the latter will in equity be subro-
gated to the right of the senior claimant to proceed against the
other fund.7 It first arose with reference to mortgages, and
was later extended to various other situations.
In discussing subrogation as applied to the two fund situation,
Williston says :8
"The justice of the principle will be apparent if it is observed that in
this way the creditor is denied the power of throwing the ultimate payment
of the debt in one way or the other as suits his caprice."
One of the earliest statements of the principle of subrogation
in this'form was made by Chief Justice Marshall in AlIston v.
Mumford,9 as follows:
"If there be two mortgagees, A the prior mortgagee upon two tracth
and B the subsequent mortgagee on only one of these tracts, if A should
appropriate to his debt the land mortgaged to B, then B would be per-
mitted to take the place of A with reference to the other tract."
The Supreme Court of the United States recognized and ap-
plied the rule in the case of Hawkins v. Blake.1 0 In that case
Devereaux as executor paid off certain legacies which were
4 5 Pomeroy Eq. Juris (2d ed.) 2288, note 1 (citing cases exhaustively).
18 R. C. L., p. 456.
5 5 Pomeroy Eq. Juris. (2d ed.) 2289, 18 R. C. L., p. 462.
6 5 Pomeroy Eq. Juris. (2d ed.) 2290.
7 18 R. C. L., p. 467.
8 2 Williston on Contracts, p. 2302.
9 1 Brock 279, Fed. Cas. 267.
10 108 U. S. 422, 27 L. Ed. 775.
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chargeable on real estate theretofore conveyed to him by his
mother, and reimbursed himself from the personal property.
The court found that the legacies should have been borne by the
real estate primarily and only secondarily by the personal prop-
erty, and that the reimbursement was therefore wrongful. At
that time, however, the real estate had passed into the hands of
assignees in bankruptcy and Devereaux was insolvent. The
next of kin who had been deprived of personal property were
held entitled as against the assignee to be subrogated to the
liens of the legatees whose legacies had constituted charges
against the real estate. The court said,
"Why are not the next of kin now entitled to stand in the place of
those legatees, in respect to the fund out of which they should have been
paid? Upon the familiar principle of marshaling assets by means of
subrogation, when a party, having a right to resort to two funds to the
detriment of another, entitled to be paid out of but one, has been satisfied
out of the later, the fund thus exonerated will in equity be subjected to the
payment of the postponed claim."
Jones v. Zollicoffer, an early North Carolina case," contains
an excellent discussion of the principle, the opinion pointing
out the difference between cases where relief will be given by
restraining the senior claimant from satisfying his claim out
of the doubly charged fund, and cases where relief will be grant-
ed by way of substitution after the election has been made.
There the court says:
"A court of equity will restrain a person in the capricious exercise of
his rights; for benevolence becomes a duty enforced by courts of justice,
when its exercise is in no wise prejudicial to the party, and a want of
it is injurious to another. Thus, when a person may get satisfaction out
of either of two funds, and another can get satisfaction only out of one
of them, and they are both equally convenient and accessible to him who
may get satisfaction out of either, and nothing but mere caprice governs
him in making the selection, there equity will restrain him to the fund not
onerated by the claims of the other; but if convenience, and not caprice, is
his motive, the most that equity does is to substitute the disappointed claim-
ant to his rights. The first is rarely done; for it is a matter of extreme
delicacy to restrain a person in the exercise of a legitimate right, in favor
of one who has no claim upon him by contract, and whose only connection
with him arises from being interested in the same common fund; yet where
there is a fraud, moral or legal, or mere caprice, he will be restrained.
The latter to wit, substitution, is very frequently done, and is the founda-
tion of marshaling assets in favor of legatees and simple contract creditors,
and applies in cases where there is neither fraud nor caprice; it is suf-
ficient that his fund has been exhausted by one who had a double means
of satisfaction."
119 N. C. 623.
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In the recent case of SoweU v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas,12 the court refused to grant marshaling in case of a suit
by an indorsee bank, holding both a right of action against an
insolvent payee and collateral security of the payee, against a
maker who has a claim against the payee, apparently mistakenly
failing to view the situation as one between creditors.13 It is
doubtful if the case was a proper one for marshaling, and the
decision can be supported on that ground. If the maker had
paid the note, he might have obtained the desired result by
means of subrogation.
Numerous other authorities illustrate various applications
of the principle of subrogation. 14
The operation of the principle is not affected by the nature of
the property which constitutes the two funds, but applies when-
ever a paramount creditor holds collateral security or can re-
sort collaterally to other property of any description for the
payment of the debt.' 5 It applies although one of the funds
consists merely of a chose in action,16 and although discharged
at law, the claim will be treated in equity as still in existence
for the benefit of the one entitled to subrogation.' 7 In general,
the doctrines relative to subrogation apply as completely against
a surety whose liability is prior to that of the party seeking
subrogation as they do against the principal debtor.' 8
A slightly different situation from the ordinary case of sub-
stitution, and the two fund doctrine, although based upon the
12 45 Sup. Ct. 528.
3. 39 Har. L. R. 256.
14 Mathews v. Memphis R. R. Co., 108 U. S. 368, 2 S. Ct. 780, 27 L. Ed.
756; Rock Springs First Nat. Bank v. Roder (C. C. A.), 114 Fed. 451;
Clark v. Manufacturers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 130 Ind. 332; Wyman v. Fort
Dearborn Bank, 181 Ill. 27, 54 N. E. 946; Farwell v. Importers' Nat. Bank,
90 N. Y. 485; Hannegan v. Hannah (Ind.), 7 Blackf. 353; Anthes v.
Schroeder (Neb.), 94 N. W. 611; Ocoback v. Baker, 52 Neb. 447, 72 N. W.
582; Dahlman v. Greenwood (Wis.), 74 N. W. 215; Hudkins v. Ward, 30
W. Va. 204, 3 S. E. 600; Dickson v. Back, 32 Ore. 217, 51 Pac. 727; We6-
ber v. Webber, 109 Mich. 147, 66 N. W. 960; Ross v. Duggan, 5 Colo. 85,
102; Hunt v. Townsend, 4 Sand. Ch. 510; In re Hobson (Ia.), 46 N. W.
1095; Cheeseborough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 409; Harriman v.
Skillman, 33 Barb. 378; Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. Jr. 382; 5 Pomeroy Eq.
Jur. (2d ed.) 2293; Story's Eq. Jurispr. (14th ed.) 853.
'5 Clark v. Manufacturers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 130 Ind. 332; Ross v.
Duggan, § Colo. 85; 5 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (2d ed.) 2288, 2351.
16 Clark v. Manufacturers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 130 Ind. 332; Dahlman
v. Greenwood (Wis.), 74 N. W; 215, 217.
17 Hawkins v. Blake, 108 U. S. 422; Lidderdale's Executors v. Executors
of Robinson, 12 Wheat. 594; Sidener v. Pavey et al., 77 Ind. 241, 246.
18 5 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (2d ed.) 2351.
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same fundamental principles, arises under some circumstances
where security given for a loan which is used to pay off an in-
cumbrance turns out to be defective, although the person taking
it expected to get good security. Under the circumstances, the
payment is held in equity to operate as an assignment of the
mortgage, and he will be subrogated to the rights of the holder
of the security discharged with his money.19
The above situations in various forms arise very frequently
in suits between banks who have advanced money to pay labor-
ers and materialmen upon public works and the sureties upon
the contractors' bonds. A contest involving some of the above
principles arose in the case of State ex rel. Southern Surety Co.
v. Schlesinger.20 There the court was confronted with a man-
damus suit by the State on the relation of the surety company
against the director of highways and public works. The facts
were briefly as follows: Relator was surety upon a contractor's
bond for the building of a certain highway. During the per-
formance of the work the contractors borrowed money from the
bank upon their notes, giving as collateral security an assign-
ment to the bank for all moneys then due or thereafter to be-
come due from the state upon said contract. The amount of
the loan was used to pay labor and material claims. The con-
tractors were unable to complete the road, and the surety com-
pany was obliged to complete it. The director of highways and
public works held a fund in his hands which had been earned
and the surety company, having expended over $7,000 in com-
pleting the road, brought the mandamus action to compel pay-
ment to it. The director of highways filed an interpleader pray-
ing that the bank and contractors be made parties, and be re-
quired to set up their claims for the determination of the court.
Thereupon the bank filed an answer and cross-petition setting
up its note and pledge, and seeking to have the amount of its
loan paid to it. By statute it was provided that the surety
19 MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U. S. 688, 17 S. Ct. 961, 42 L. Ed. 326;
Sidener v. Pavey, 77 Ind. 241, 246; Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt, 168
Ill. 618, 48 N. E. 161; Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 52 N. W. 31;
Hughes v. Thomas, 131 Wis. 315, 111 N. W. 474; Heuser v. Sharman, 89
Ia. 355, 56 N. W. 525; Crippen v. Chappel, 35 Kas. 495, 11 Pac. 453; Hall
v. Marshall, 139 Mich. 123, 102 N. W. 658; Berry v. Stigall, 253 Mo. 690;
Patterson v. Birdsall, 64 N. W. 294; Straman v. Rechtine (Ohio), 51 N. E.
44; Amick v. Woodworth (Ohio), 50 N. E. 437; Brandt on Suretyship 326;
5 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (2d ed.) 2347, note 87; 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (4th ed.)
1211 if.; 27 Cyc. 1438; 25 R. C. L. 1343. See Miller v. Scott (Ohio), 154
N. E. 358.
20 (Ohio) 151 N. E. 177, 45 A. L. R. 371.
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bond shall contain "an additional obligation for the payment by
the contractor, and by all subcontractors, for all labor per-
formed or materials furnished in the construction, erection,
alteration or repair of such building, works or improvements."
The contention of the surety was that it stood in the position of
the state afid that having paid out money to complete the road,
it was subrogated to all rights the state would have if the state
had declared the contract forfeited and had proceeded to com-
plete the work, and that the contractors could not make an as-
signment of the funds as collateral security to the bank, even
though the money was used to pay labor and material claims,
if the effect was to deprive the surety of its right to stand in
the position of the state. In other words, they contended that
the surety having completed the road, was subrogated or sub-
stituted to the right of the state to retain the amount in its
hands to reimburse itself for any loss. The bank, on the other
hand, contended that the laborers and materialmen had an elec-
tion to proceed either against the surety on its bond or against
the retained fund, and since the bank's money was used to pay
them, the bank was subrogated to their rights. It will be ob-
served that although the laborers and materialmen had two or
more funds from which they could collect (the retained percent-
age, a right of action against the surety and also a claim against
the contractor) this is not an example of the two fund doctrine,
not being a case where the bank is deprived of its fund, but is
an example of the first type, namely, substitution. The bank
was merely seeking to be substituted to the right of the laborers
and materialmen against the fund by reason of the fact that it
paid out its money. Not having seen fit to take an assignment
of their claims from the laborers and materialmen, it is evident
that the bank loaned its money on the credit of the contractor,
and relied upon the assignment of the contract for security.
Since the contract was of no value, they reserved nothing from
it, and their right against the contractor alone remains.21 But,
assuming that the bank had actually paid laborers and material-
men and is seeking to be substituted to their rights, and the
surety is seeking to be substituted to the rights of the state,
then since the rights of the state are superior to the rights of
the laborers and materialmen, the equities of the surety are su-
perior to those of the bank. Of course the surety standing in
the shoes of the state would even prevail over the laborers and
materialmen except for the reason that it has relinquished that
21 Illinois Surety Co. v. City of Gallon, 211 Fed. 161; Henningsen V. U. S.
F. & G., 208 U. S. 404.
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superior quality by contract when it became surety for labor
and material claims. It has not relinquished it in favor of any
one else, however. This is what the dissenting opinion had in
mind at page 180 of the Schlesinger case where the court says:
"Had the loaner, instead of advancing the sum of $800, for the payment
of materials, actually furnished the materials, there could be no doubt
that it would have a lienable claim for that amount."
The answer to that argument is that the surety surrendered
its equity only to laborers and materialmen and to no one else.
In case, however, the equity of the bank should be superior to
that of the surety for any reason (as by consent, agreement or
otherwise) then the situation is reversed, and the bank should
prevail. Few, if any, of the cases involve this stage of subro-
gation.
The majority of the court held that the right of subrogation
of the surety operated as an equitable assignment, which right
attached at the time the contract of suretyship was entered
into, and that it took priority over the assignment, legal or
equitable, which may be given by the contractor to any third
party who enters into the transaction after its inception. The
court therefore found that the right of the surety in the fund
prevailed over that of the bank. (Three justices dissenting.)
It is submitted that the majority opinion is clearly right and
that the dissenting opinion shows a failure to comprehend the
principles of subrogation hereinbefore discussed. As pointed
out in the majority opinion a surety upon a contractor's bond
required by statute for the performance of a contract for pub-
lic work has an equitable lien upon the fund to be used in pay-
ment therefore which arises when the bond is executed.22 The
22 Prairie State Nat. Bank v. United States, 17 S. Ct. 142, 164 U. S.
227, 41 L. Ed. 412; Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
28 S. Ct. 389, 208 U. S. 404, 52 L. Ed. 547; In re Freeman & Brooks (7th
C. C. A.), 1 Fed. (2d) 430; Henningsen v. U. S. F. & G. Co. (9th C. C. A.),
143 Fed. 810; Hardaway v. National Surety Co., 211 U. S. 552, 29 S. Ct.
202, 53 L. Ed. 321; First National Bank of Seattle v. City Trust, Safe Deposit
& Surety Co. of Philadelphia. (9th C. C. A.), 114 Fed. 529; Hardaway &
ProweU v. National Surety Co. (6th C. C. A.), 150 Fed. 465; Title Guaranty
& Surety Co. v. Dutcher, 203 Fed. 167; Pratt Lumber Co. v. Gill Co., 278 Fed.
783; Cox v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 247 Fed. 955; Columbia Digger
Co. v. Sparks, 227 Fed. 780; Peoples National Bank v. Corse, 133 Tenn.
720, 182 S. W. 917; American Bonding Co. v. Central Trust Co., 240 Fed.
400; Wasco County v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 88 Ore. 465, 172
Pac. 126, L. 1M A. 1918 D. 732, Ann. Cas. 1918 E. 656; Derby v. U. S. F.
& G. Co., 87 Ore. 34, 169 Pac. 500; First National Bank v. Pasha, 99 Neb.
785, 157 N. W. 924; Neodesha Nat. Bank v. Russell, 109 Kans. 562, 200
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Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Prairie State
Bank v. United States furnishes a good example. There the
question arose as to whether the surety (Hitchcock) on the con-
tractor's bond or the bank who was assignee of the reserved
fund had a prior lien upon the fund retained by the govern-
ment where the contiactor defaulted and the surety completed
the work. In holding that the lien if any acquired by the bank
was subordinate to the equity of the surety therein arising at
the date of the contract, the court said,
"The sole question, therefore, is whether the equitable lien which'the
bank claims it has, without reference to the question of its subrogation is
paramount to the right of subrogation which unquestionably exists in favor
of Hitchcock. In other words, the rights of the parties depend upon
whether Hitchcock's subrogation must be considered as arising from, and
relating back to the date of, the original contract, or as taking its origin
solely from the date of the advance by him." * * *
"Hitchcock's right of subrogation, when it became capable of enforce-
ment, was a right to resort to the securities and remedies which the cred-
itor (the United States) was capable of asserting against its debtor, Sund-
berg & Co., had the security not satisfied the obligation of the contractors;
and one of such remedies was the right, based upon the original contract,
to appropriate the 10 percent retained in its hands. If the United States
had been compelled to complete the work, its right to forfeit the 10 per-
cent, and apply the accumulations in reduction of the damage sustained,
remained. The right of Hitchcock to subrogation, therefore, would clearly
entitled him, when, as surety, he fulfilled the obligation of Sundberg & Co.,
to the government, to be substituted to the rights which the United States
might have asserted against the fund. It would hardly be claimed that,
if the sureties had failed to avail themselves of the privilege of completing
the work, they would not be entitled to a credit of the 10 per cent reserved
in reduction of the excess of cost to the government in completing the work
beyond the sum actually paid to the contractor, irrespective of the source
from which the contractor had obtained the material and labor which went
into the building."
This reasoning has been generally followed. Some of the
cases either purport to place the decision upon the ground that
a bank in loaning money to a contractor is under no obligation
to do so, and is therefore to be treated as a volunteer and so ac-
quires no rights or contain dicta to that effect. 23 The sound-
Pac. 281; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Ripley County Bank, 208
Mo. App. 560, 237 S. W. 182.
2 3 State v. Schlesinger (Supra); Henningsen v. U. S. F. & Co., 2q
S. Ct. 389, 208 U. S. 404, 52 L. Ed. 547; Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. First
State Bank of Paris (Tex. Civ. App.), 194 S. W. 1012; Carr Hardware
Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Surety Co., 190 Ia. 1320, 181 N. W. 680; Hess
& Skinner Engineering Co. v. Turney, 110 Tex. 148, 216 S. W. 621;
American Bonding Co. v. Central Trust Co., 240 Fed. 400; Aetna Life Ins.
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ness of this ground has been questioned since even in case of a
voluntary payment by the bank an implied assumpsit might be
based upon a subsequent ratification by the debtor.24 However
where the bank pays the money at the request of the contractor
(as is the usual case) it is not a volunteer at all.25 The author
of Brandt on Suretyship in enumerating the three classes com-
prising those entitled to subrogation states the third class to be
those who act at the request of the debtor directly or indirectly
or upon invitation of the public. Of this third class the author
says,
"Cases coming third in the classification suggested above are those
in which payment is made by a stranger to the obligation acting neither
under compulsion nor for self protection, but at the request of some party
liable for the debt. In these cases perhaps upon the ground of an implied
promise the party making the payment is usually held subrogated to the
rights of him who is paid."
The cases cannot therefore be disposed of on the evasive
ground that equity will not aid a volunteer. To do so would be
misapjplication of an equitable maxim. In the last analysis the
matter for the determination of the court is simply which of
the parties has the superior equity. In the State v. Sehlesinger
case the right of subrogation of the surety was paramount to
the right of the bank since the surety's prior right to the fund
arising at the time of the contract of suretyship could not be
impaired by any act of the contractor and the bank.26
The dissenting opinion seems to attach some importance to the
fact that the state claimed no right in the retained fund. That
is the very reason for the invocation of subrogation, which is
to prevent a paramount creditor from having the power to
throw the loss where it chooses, or convenience or caprice dic-
Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 31 L. Ed. 537, 8 S. Ct. 625; Prairie State
National Bank v. United States, 164 U. S. 227, 17 S. Ct. 142.
24 While the debtor has the right to repudiate such payment and refuse
to indemnify the stranger, he has no right to benefit by it. If repudiated,
since the debtor has been paid by the stranger, he should hold the claim
in trust for him. Accordingly in such cases the stranger or volunteer
should then be entitled to reimbursement in case of subsequent ratification
and otherwise to subrogation. Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625; Crumbish
v. Central Implement Co., 38 W. Va. 390; Kenan v. Holloway, 16. Ala. 53,
5 Pom. Eq. Jurispr. (2d ed.) 912, 921 d. See Gifford v. Corrigan, 117
N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756.
25 Warlord v. Hankins, 150 Ind. 489, 493; Clark v. Marlow, 149 Ind. 41;
Brandt on Suretyship 325; 5 Pom. Eq. Jurispr. 2347.
26 Prairie State National Bank v. United States (supra).
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tates.2 T In the last paragraph of the dissenting opinion the
writer expresses his inability "to see why a surety who has
guaranteed against its principal's default should avail itself
of that default and recover as against a creditor who has in
good faith loaned its money to pay for labor and materials fur-
nished that surety's principal." It seems rather inaccurate to
say that the surety is availing itself of the default of the prin-
cipal. As for the propositi6n that the bank has loaned its money
in good faith to pay off laborers and materialmen who were
creditors of the surety's principal, the answer would be that it
loaned the money on the credit of that principal and not at the
request of the surety, knowing that theosurety had an equitable
lien upon the reserved fund ahead of the bank, and which could
not be impaired by the assignment to the bank.
There are authorities which state the rule broadly, and per-
haps without regard to its full legal significance, that subroga-
tion will not be granted where one of the funds consists of the
liability of a surety. For example where one creditor can pro-
ceed either against the property of the principal debtor or
against a surety, and another creditor can proceed only against
the property of the principal debtor, the former creditor or-
dinarily cannot be compelled to proceed against the surety and
permit the other creditor to collect his debt from the principal,
and the reason assigned is the one above stated.28 It is sub-
mitted that this broad statement ought to be qualified by add-
ing "unless the equity of the one seeking subrogation is superior
to the equity of the surety." The usual application of the rule is
shown in the following class of cases. Separate lands of a hus-
band and wife are mortgaged to secure the debt of the husband.
A junior mortgage is executed by the husband upon his own
land. It has been generally held that the junior mortgagee can-
not compel the senior mortgagee to first exhaust the property
of the wife because her equity is equal or superior to that of
the junior mortgages.2 9 Other cases involving substantially
similar situations deny marshaling or subrogation against a
27Pace v. Pace's Admr., 95 Va. 792; II Williston on Contracts 1265;
18 R. C. L., p. 456.
28 5 Por. Eq. Jurispr. (2d ed.) 2291; Ex parte Kendal, 17 Ves. 520;
Swift & Co. v. Kortrech, 112 Fed. 709; Trentman v. Eldridge, 98 Ind. 525;
In re Hobson, 81 Ia. 392, 46 N. W. 1095; Woolen v. Hillen, 9 Gill. 185, 52
Am. Dec. 690; Dorr v. Shaw, 4 Johns. Ch. 17; Hall v. Myer, 48 W. Va.
.353, 37 S. E. 594.
29 Swift & Co. v. Kortecht (supra); Gaines v. Hill, 147 Ky. 445, 144
S. W. 92; Stewart v. Stewart, 209 Pa. 59, 56 Atl. 323; Zeller v. Henry, 157
Pa. 1, 27 Atl. 559; Shinn v. Smith, 79 N. C. 310.
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surety but in all of them the facts show that the junior creditor
has no superior equity against the surety.3 0 In many of the
cases the courts qualified the holding with such words as "unless
he has the superior equity" as in Trentman v. Eldridge,31 or "in
the absence of some special equity" as in In re Hobson.32 In the
latter case the court states the true principle of marshaling as-
sets as follows:
"In the absence of some special equity, it is not applicable to a case
where one of the funds is the property of a surety. If a surety be com-
pelled to pay the debt of his principal, he becomes his creditor by virtue
of the payment with the right of subrogation."
Where the surety has no such right of subrogation, or reim-
bursement either because he has postponed his right to that of
the creditor or because for some other reason the creditor has
a superior equity, such a "special equity" arises and no reason
exists for refusing marshaling or subrogation against the
surety. In two cases the courts have found circumstances to
exist that rendered the equity of the creditor superior to that
of the surety and entitled the creditor to subrogation even
against a surety.33 It would seem therefore that the true state-
ment of the rule would be that marshaling or subrogation will
be granted although one of the funds is the liability of a surety,
provided that the equity of the one seeking relief is superior to
that of the surety.
It has been further stated that the rule is only applicable be-
tween creditors of one debtor and that both funds must belong
to one debtor.34 For example where one creditor has a claim
against two debtors and another creditor has a claim against
but one of them, the latter cannot as a rule require the joint
creditor to proceed to collect his debt from the one against
whom the other creditor cannot resort. The principle here is
the same as in the case of the surety. In the case of the surety
his right to reimbursement usually fixes his equity as superior
to that of the one seeking relief by marshaling or subrogation.
In the case of joint debtors the one paying has a right not of
reimbursement (as in the case of the ordinary surety) but of
30 Union Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheat. 390, 4 U. S. (L. Ed.) 269; Thompson
v. Spittle, 102 Mass. 207; Mason v. Hull (Ohio), 45 N. E. 632; Jenkins v.
Smith, 48 N. Y. Supp. 126.
31 98 Ind. 525.
32 (Ia.) 46 N. W. 1095.
33 Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Chouteau Trust Co., 264 Fed.
793; Chouteau Trust Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 1 Fed. 136.
34 5 Pom. Eq. Jurispr. (2d ed.) 2291.
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contribution which gives him a paramount equity to that of the
one seeking relief. To compel the joint creditor to collect his
debt from the one not liable to the other creditor, or to allow
subrogation in the latter's favor would defeat an equal or su-
perior equity and for that reason the statement has been made
that there must be a common debtor. The same qualification
should be made, it is submitted, to the so-called common debtor
requirement, that was suggested in case of the surety. Where
there is some supervening equity which makes the equity of
the surety or of the other joint debtor inferior to that of the
one seeking marshaling or subrogation, the superior equity
should be recognized and relief granted by way of marshaling
or subrogation, even though a surety or joint debtor is involved.
This so-called common debtor requirement was first stated by
Lord Eldon in Ex parte KendallU3 5 as follows:
"We have gone this length. If A has a right to go upon two funds,
and B upon one, having both the same debtor, and the funds are the prop-
erty of the same person, A shall take payment from that fund to which he
can resort exclusively, so that both may be paid. But it was never said,
that if I have a demand against A and B, that a creditor of B shall compel
me to go against A without more. If I have a demand against both, the
creditors of B have no right to compel me to seek payment from A if not
founded in some equity, giving B for his own sake, as if he was surety,
etc., a right to compel me to seek payment of A. It must be established
that it is just and equitable that A ought to pay in the first instance, or
there is no equity to compel a man to go against A, who has resort to both
funds."
. The case recognizes that where there is some supervening
equity whereby the entire debt should be paid by the debtor
against whom the junior creditor has no right, marshaling or
subrogation will be granted even though there is no common
debtor.30 In Boone v. Clark3, the court states that the principle
of marshaling assets does not apply where a creditor has a lien
upon two funds of two separate debtors, and a creditor of one of
35 17 Ves. 514, 520.
36 The following authorities recognize that supervening equities may
render the common debtor requirement inapplicable. Ayres v. Husted, 15
Conn. 503, 515; Dorr v. Shaw, 4 John. Ch. 17; Lloyd v. Galbraith, 32 Pa.
St. 103; Rixey v. Pearre (Va.), 15 S. E. 498; Sanders v. Cook, 22 Ind. 436,
439, and the courts have not only recognized but allowed subrogation in the
following cases: Wise v. Shepard, 13 Ill. 42, 47; Huston's Appeal, 69 Pa. St.
485; Hodges v. Hickey (Miss.), 7 So. 404; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Stanton
(Minn.), 56 N. W. 821; Clark v. Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 130
Ind. 332. See also Sterling v. Brightbill (Penn.), 5 Watts 229; Adams v.
Young, 200 Mass. 588, 86 N. E. 942.
=.7 129 Ill. 466, 21 N. E. 850.
DETERMINATION OF SUPERIOR EQUITIES
the debtors has a lien upon one of the funds. However the
opinion cites as authority Wise v. Shepard where the equitable
exception to the rule is both recognized and applied.
In legal effect joint debtors are as between themselves each
principals as to half and sureties as to half. They are only dif-
ferent from sureties in that the surety is generally entitled to
full reimbursement if compelled to pay whereas they are only
entitled to half. Equity will protect either the surety or joint
debtor therefore unless there is some special equity by reason
of which marshaling or subrogation should be granted in spite
of the fact that the one against whom it is sought is a surety or
is not a common debtor. The authorities cited in the case of a
surety are therefore equally applicable to the common debtor
requirement.
The real determination of the right to marshaling and reim-
bursement in this class of cases should therefore depend upon
who has the superior equity. It is a misapplication of the
maxim to decide the cases on the ground that equity will not aid
a volunteer. Moreover the requirement of a common debtor is
not sound nor is the statement that relief will not be granted
where one of the funds is the liability of a surety. The reason
for the common debtor requirement and the surety exception is
that ordinarily they have the superior equity, but that result
need not necessarily follow and the repetition of that principle
may result in a failure to look into the equities and thus reach
a wrong result.
